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Abstract
This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into 
account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in 
international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of 
international customary law and treaty interpretation, and that they are attributable to the 
litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present 
the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This 
consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting Sates in politically sensitive 
cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and that of 
their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the 
availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since 
it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.
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This article investigates the role of counsel before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) from the perspective of the legal value of their 
pleadings. Commenting on his own experience before the Court as 
counsel for numerous States, the late Sir Ian Brownlie stated that “[i]n 
the preparation of written and oral arguments before international 
tribunals, the freelance pleaders are working exclusively as 
representatives of the State concerned”,1 cautioning at the same time 
that “[i]f the barrister simply identifies with the client in all respects, his 
value will diminish.” 2 These two statements may appear as a 
contradiction: whereas in the first part Brownlie recognised that counsel 
speaks for the State, in the second one he emphasised the need to 
acknowledge that the ideas of a lawyer and that of the State they assists 





may differ. This article aims at exploring this thin line on which counsel 
before the ICJ thread, taking into account the value of their pleadings 
under international law. Addressing this perspective contributes to 
understanding the legal position of counsel acting in politically sensitive 
cases such as those against their State of nationality or involving serious 
violations of human rights.
This article aims a filling a lacuna in existing scholarship. So far, the 
role of counsel has been mainly analysed from the standpoint of 
practitioners who have acted in this capacity, with contributions covering 
interesting practical issues such as the different styles and traditions of 
pleadings3 or advocacy strategies and techniques.4 The issue of the legal 
value of the statements of counsel before the Court has attracted less 
3 See, e.g., James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Catherine Redgwell, “Anglo-American and 
Continental Traditions in Advocacy before International Courts and Tribunals”, 2 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (2013), 1, 
https://doi.org/10.7574/cjicl.02.04.128.
4 James Crawford, “Advocacy Before International Tribunals in State-To-State Cases”, 
in D. Bishop and E. G. Kehoe (eds.), The Art of Advocacy in International Arbitration 
(2nd ed., 2010), 303, 330; Sergio Ugalde and Juan José Quintana, “Managing Litigation 
before the International Court of Justice”, 9 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 
(2018), 691, https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idy027; Alain Pellet and Tessa Barsac, 
“Litigation Strategy”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law online 
(2019).
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attention, largely because general studies on the representation of States 
before the ICJ have focused mainly on the role of the agent.5 
In order to address this topic, this article investigates the legal 
differences between agents on the one hand, and counsel on the other, 
assessing whether the pleadings of counsel can be characterised as acts 
of the litigating States, taking into account rules from different areas of 
international law and a variety of judicial and scholarly sources. The 
article explores also the approach of counsel that have pleaded in 
politically sensitive cases, concluding that the availability of first rate legal 
assistance for all parties is indispensable for the proper functioning of the 
ICJ, the legitimacy of the international judicial function, and, overall, the 
international rule of law.
Although this article focuses on the role of counsel before the ICJ, when 
appropriate, practice from other international courts and tribunals where 
State counsel play a role is taken into account. 
2 Agents, Counsel, and Advocates: Between Holy Trinity 
and Overlapping Roles
This section deals with the role of counsel in the representation and 
assistance of States before the ICJ in light of the rules embodied in the 
ICJ Statute and other applicable rules. In order to assess this issue, it is 
5 See, e.g., Roberto Monaco, “Représentation et défense des Parties devant les instances 
internationales”, in E. Diez (ed.), Festschrift für Rudolf Bindschedler (1980), 373.
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necessary to clarify the distinctions – if any – between agents, counsel, 
and advocates, the three professional figures usually mentioned together 
by the relevant provisions. Their different roles should be taken into 
account in discussing whether the acts of counsel should be considered 
as acts of the State under international law. This discussion is specific to 
the proceedings before the ICJ, where the distinction between agents 
versus counsel is provided by the Statute.6
2.1 The Agent or, The Representation of the State before the ICJ
Article 42 of the ICJ Statue is the main rule that governs the 
representation of States before the ICJ in relation to the oral phase before 
the Court.7 In line with past practice of international courts and arbitral 
tribunals,8 the first paragraph of Article 42 provides that “[t]he parties 
shall be represented by agents.” The ICJ Statute does not embody any 
6 Indeed, before investor-State arbitral tribunals, counsel can represent States (see, 
e.g., Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2005-04/AA227, 18 July 2014, para. 1880).
7 See Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, “International Courts and Tribunals, Agents, Counsel 
and Advocates”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law online (2006); 
Franklin Berman and Gleider Hernández, “Article 42”, in A. Zimmermann et al. (eds.), 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (3rd ed., 2019), 1203.
8 E.g., Article 62, 1907 Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits 
internationaux; Article 42, 1920 Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.
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rules on whom can be designed as agent. On account of State sovereignty 
and of the States’ right to organise the governmental apparatus without 
external interference, States are free to choose whoever they prefer as 
agent before the ICJ.9 As affirmed by Judge Cot, in inter-State litigations, 
States “acting in sovereign fashion, organize their representation and the 
defence of their interests. They do so at their own risk.”10 There is no 
prerequisite that agents be lawyers, as demonstrated by the fact that, in 
1922, the drafters of the rules governing the Permanent Court of 
International Justice decided not to include any formal requirements 
regarding the agent’s professional qualifications.11 Usually, the agent is a 
member of the administration of the State, often appointed among the 
ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.12 Sometimes, the agent is the 
9 Shabtai Rosenne, “International Court of Justice: Practice Directions on Judges ad Hoc; 
Agents, Counsel and Advocates; and Submission of New Documents”, 1 Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2002), 223, 225, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/157180302760505343.
10 Grand Prince case (Belize v. France), Prompt Release, Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2001, 
17, Declaration of Judge Ad hoc Cot, para. 15. See, also, ITLOS, The M/V Louisa case 
(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain), Merits, Judgment, ITLOS 
Reports 2013, 237, Individual Opinion of Judge Cot, para. 48.
11 Malcolm N. Shaw, Rosenne’s Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2015 
(5th ed., 2016), para. 277. 
12 See, e.g., the British practice described in Arthur D. Watts, “International Law and 
International Relations: United Kingdom Practice”, 2 European Journal of International 
Law (1991), 157, 159, https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/2.1.157.
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very Head of State, Prime Minister, or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,13 
especially when the litigation before the ICJ is considered to be highly 
political at the domestic level.14 However, in recent years, there has been 
a substantial trend towards delegation of sovereign State representation 
before the ICJ and other international adjudicative bodies to private 
individuals formally not belonging to the State apparatus.15 
Notwithstanding the fact that, in principle, anyone could be appointed as 
an agent, on one occasion an ICJ judge criticised the appointment of a 
private lawyer as an agent in his individual opinion,16 which was followed 
by similar remarks in another individual opinion appended to a decision 
13 The Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddegh, appeared, with no formal 
designation and alongside an agent, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (Jurisdiction), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports I952, 93. President of Bolivia Evo Morales was listed as co-
agent in the case Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018, 507. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar (de 
facto Head of Government) Aung San Suu Kyi is the agent in the case Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia 
v. Myanmar), Order of 23 January 2020, www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-
20200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
14 On the practical considerations relevant for the appointment of agents, see Michael J. 
Matheson, “Practical Aspects of the Agent’s Role in Cases before the International 
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of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).17 Similarly, 
in the different field of investment arbitrations, it has been argued that 
an agent from the executive branch could enhance credibility, reliability 
and legitimacy of the State’s position.18
Before the ICJ, the only limitation to the choice of the agent is posed 
by rules on incompatibility such as Article 17(1) of the ICJ Statute, 
according to which “[n]o member of the Court may act as agent, counsel, 
or advocate in any case”, and Article 17(2), which declares that “[n]o 
member may participate in the decision of any case in which he has 
previously taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the 
parties”.19 Moreover, Practice Direction VII affirms that “parties should 
likewise refrain from designating as agent, counsel or advocate in a case 
Court”, 1 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2002), 467, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/156918502761939026.
15 Jean-Pierre Cot, “Appearing ‘for’ or ‘on Behalf of’ a State: The Role of Private Counsel 
before International Tribunals”, in N. Ando, E. McWhinney and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Liber 
Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (2002), 835, 840.
16 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda), Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 2000, 111, Declaration of Judge Oda, 
132-133. See, generally, Cot, supra note 15, at 835-847.
17 Grand Prince case, Declaration of Judge Ad Hoc Cot, supra note 10, para. 14.
18 Jeremy K. Sharpe, “The Agent’s Indispensable Role in International Investment 
Arbitration”, 33 ICSID Review (2018), 675, 680-684, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siy017.
19 This provision is integrated by Article 34 of the Rules of the Court. See Philippe 
Couvreur, “Article 17”, in Zimmermann et al., supra note 7, 444, 449-451.
9
before the Court a person who sits as judge ad hoc in another case before 
the Court”, while Practice Direction VIII states that parties should do the 
same in relation to “a person who in the three years preceding the date 
of the designation was a Member of the Court, judge ad hoc, Registrar, 
Deputy-Registrar or higher official of the Court.” These rules aims at 
preserving the credibility of the Court rather than constraining the 
freedom of choice of States in the appointment of their agents, as 
demonstrated by their location in the section on the organisation of the 
Court.20
The very wording of Article 42(2) allows no doubt that the agent is an 
organ of the State tasked with its representation before the ICJ, in line 
with relevant arbitral practice.21 The agent is usually equated to a 
diplomatic representative of the State in its relation to the Court or other 
adjudicative body.22 If the agent is appointed within the Head of the 
State, the Head of the Government, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
then its power to represent the State is inherent in its role under 
international law, whereas, if another individual is appointed as agent, 
20 Rosenne, supra note 9; Arthur Watts, “New Practice Directions of the International 
Court of Justice”, 1 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2002), 247, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/157180302760505352.
21 French-Mexican Claims Commission (Georges Pinson (France) v. United Mexican 
States), V RIAA 327, 355.
22 Affaire des navires Cape Horn Pigeon, James Hamilton Lewis, C. H. White et Kate and 
Anna (Etats-Unis d’Amérique c. Russie), IX RIAAA 51, 60; Monaco, supra note 5, at 375.
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then they must show credentials from one of the aforementioned 
organs,23 which are usually attributed following domestic law.24 
Before any international tribunal, the role of the agent is to act as the 
intermediary between the State and the tribunal on matters of 
procedures,25 so that the agent “has exclusive control over the relations 
between the Government and the Court in respect of that particular 
case.”26 As a consequence of the role of the agent as representative of 
the State, their word binds the State before international tribunals such 
as the ICJ.27 In this vein, the ICJ Statute and the Rules of the Court 
prescribe that certain procedural activities should be reserved to the 
agent. For instance, the application instituting proceedings before the 
23 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Provisional Measures, 
Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, 3, 11, para. 13; idem, Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 595, 622, para. 44. The rule is shaped on Article 5 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
24 Monaco, supra note 5, at 377; Berman and Hernández, supra note 7, at 1204.
25 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment of 24 July 1964, I.C.J. Reports 1964, 6, 23; Arbitration between Barbados 
and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, relating to the Delimitation of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf between Them, XXVII RIAAA, 147, para. 291.
26 Shaw, supra note 11, at para. 277.
27 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits), PCIJ Reports, Series A – 
No. 7, 13; Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, supra 
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ICJ28 and the the original of every pleading29 must be signed by them. In 
general, “all steps on behalf of the parties after proceedings have been 
instituted shall be taken by agents”, who also receive all the 
communication pertaining to the case.30 
Although a literal interpretation of Article 42 of the ICJ Statute would 
lead one to consider the appointment of an agent to be compulsory for 
all the parties to a dispute before the ICJ,31 the context of this provision 
demonstrates that only the applicant has a legal duty to appoint an 
agent.32 In particular, if a State decides not to participate in any way in 
the litigation there is no legal duty or practical need to appoint an agent.33
From the ensemble of rules pertaining to the agent before the ICJ, and 
in line with arbitral practice, it is evident that the agent plays an 
indispensable role regarding the relation between the State and the 
note 25, at para. 291; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
No. ARB/01/8, Decision of 1 September 2006, 15-16, para. 49; Questions relating to 
the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor‑Leste v. Australia), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 2014, I.C.J. Reports 2014, 147, 158, para. 44.
28 Article 38(3) of the Rules of the Court.
29 Ibid., Article 52(1).
30 Ibid., Article 40(1). Other procedural powers are mentioned ibid., Article 31 (on 
discussing procedural matters with the President) and by Article 49 of the ICJ Statute 
(on the production of documents and explanations).
31 Monaco, supra note 5, at 375.
32 Shaw, supra note 11, at para. 277.
33 Ibid.; Juan José Quintana, Litigation at the International Court of Justice: Practice and 
Procedure (2015), 417.
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Court, acting as the voice of the State and undertaking all the sovereign 
functions that are linked to State participation in judicial proceedings. 
2.2 Counsel and Advocates or, The Legal Assistance to the State
Article 42(2) of the ICJ Statute provides that States parties to a case 
before the ICJ “may have the assistance of counsel or advocates before 
the Court.” The use of the word “may” shows that a State is free not to 
appoint any counsel or advocate to assist the agent.34
There is no rule defining the concepts of “counsel” and “advocate”. 
Whereas Rosenne suggests that “counsel” refers only to individuals with 
legal qualifications, such as members of national Bars or law professors,35 
Valencia-Ospina takes the opposite stance, noting that “advocate” may 
be a synonym of “lawyer”.36 According to Remiro Brotóns, “advocate” 
should be applied only to individuals who plead before the Court, whereas 
“counsel” would encompass also those who advise the State in the written 
phase.37 The International Law Association (ILA) adopts a broad and 
34 Monaco, supra note 5, at 375, 380. 
35 Rosenne, supra note 9, at 225, fn 5. 
36 Valencia-Ospina, supra note 7, at para. 10.
37 Antonio Remiro Brotóns, “The International Legal Consultancy of Governments from 
the Outside”, in C. Jimenez Piernas (ed.), The Legal Practice in International Law and 
European Community Law: A Spanish Perspective (2006), 489, 500; Esperenza Orihuela 
Calatayud, “Antonio Remiro Brotóns: asesor de gobiernos y abogado internacional”, in 
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elastic definition of “counsel”, which encompasses any person 
“representing, appearing on behalf of, or providing legal advice to a party 
in proceedings before an international court or tribunal, however such 
person may be described, and whether or not the person has professional 
legal training or is admitted as a member of a bar association or other 
professional body”.38 In the practice of the Court, States are free to use 
the expressions “counsel” and “advocate” interchangeably, with no legal 
difference from one or another designation.39
Although the agent, the only indispensable figure, may undertake 
activities habitually performed by the counsel, usually States prefer to 
seek the assistance of specialised international lawyers. In the absence 
of a formal ICJ Bar,40 counsel are chosen among a quite restricted group 
of English and French speaking international law professors and 
barristers, who have gained practical knowledge of the functioning of the 
J. Díez-Hochleitner et al. (eds), Principios y justicia en el Derecho Internacional: Libro 
homenaje al Profesor Antonio Remiro Brotóns (2018), 19, 23-24.
38 ILA, The Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing before 
International Courts and Tribunals (2010), Principle 1.
39 Monaco, supra note 5, at 380; Berman and Hernández, supra note 7, at 1209, fn 35; 
Andreas R. Ziegler and Kabre R. Jonathan, “The Legitimacy of Private Lawyers 
Representing States Before International Tribunals”, in Freya Baetens (ed.), Legitimacy 
of Unseen Actors in International Adjudication (2019), 544, 547-548.
40 See the position of the Registry in Electricité de Beyrouth Company (France v. 
Lebanon) case, ICJ Pleadings (1953), 531. 
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ICJ through working on numerous cases.41 As in relation to the agents, 
the ICJ Statute does not require that counsel are lawyers,42 even though 
this is often in the best interest of the appointing State. Indeed, States 
trusts some individuals who have appeared many times before the ICJ to 
know the “rules of the game”, often trying to assemble a strong legal 
team that mixes generalist international lawyers with experts of the 
specific subject-matter of the dispute.43 Frequently, the choice of 
university professors as counsel takes into account the views previously 
expressed by them in their academic role, since scholars may feel 
uncomfortable to present States’ arguments in conflict with their previous 
writings, which could be easily used by the opposing party against their 
very authors.44 Nationals of the opposing party are frequently included 
too, especially if the dispute requires a deep knowledge of the other 
41 Mohammed Bedjaoui, “The ‘Manufacture’ of Judgments at the International Court of 
Justice”, 51 International Court of Justice Yearbook (1996–1997), 237. This group is 
labelled as a “mafia” by Alain Pellet, “The Role of the International Lawyer in 
International litigation”, in C. Wickremasinghe (ed.), The International Lawyer as 
Practitioner (2000), 147. See, generally, James Crawford, “The International Law Bar: 
Essence Before Existence?”, in J, d’Aspremont et al. (eds), International Law as a 
Profession (2017) 338.
42 Humphrey Waldock, “The International Court of Justice as Seen from Bar and Bench”, 
54 British Yearbook of International Law (1983), 1, 3, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/54.1.1.
43 Pellet and Barsac, supra note 4, at paras. 5-9.
44 See, with some autobiographic references, Remiro Brotóns, supra note 37, at 518-
519. 
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State’s internal law.45 Usually, the costs of these teams weighs 
significantly on the overall expenses related to the participation in 
international legal proceedings, with possible concerns of access to 
competent assistance by less wealthy States.46
More recently, there is a trend to include among the counsel some 
experts (for instance scientific or technical experts) or even witnesses, 
who present their scientific or technical views as well as their personal 
recollections while acting as counsel.47 Deciding on the weight to accord 
to this expert evidence in a 2010 case, the ICJ stressed that it would have 
been more useful had they been presented as expert witnesses, rather 
than as counsel.48 The Court clarified that “those persons who provide 
evidence before the Court based on their scientific or technical knowledge 
45 Ibid., 505.
46 See Cesare P.R. Romano, “International Justice and Developing Countries 
(Continued): A Qualitative Analysis”, 1 Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals (2002), 531, 553-557, https://doi.org/10.1163/156918502761939044; Alicia 
Miron, “Le coût de la justice internationale: enquête sur les aspects financiers du 
contentieux interétatique”, 60 Annuaire français de droit international (2014), 241, 256-
257.
47 See, generally, Giorgio Gaja, “Assessing Expert Evidence in the ICJ”, 15 The Law & 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2016), 409, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-1234133; and the papers collected in L. Boisson de 
Chazournes et al. (eds.), “Special Issue: Experts in the International Adjudicative 
Process”, 9 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2018), 339.
48 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2010, 14, para. 167. 
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and on their personal experience should testify before the Court as 
experts, witnesses or in some cases in both capacities, rather than 
counsel, so that they may be submitted to questioning by the other party 
as well as by the Court.”49 Maybe as a consequence of this position, 
States refrained from using experts as counsel in subsequent disputes.50
Although the aforementioned rules on incompatibility introduced by 
Practice Directions VII and VIII apply to counsel, their conduct is not 
governed by any ethical standard at the levels of the ICJ Statute and of 
the Rules of the Court.51 To fill this lacuna, over the time, scholars have 
intensively plead for more regulations for the conduct of counsel before 
the ICJ and other inter-State adjudicative bodies.52 This claim has 
received a partial answer in a series of non-binding codes of conduct that 
have been produced and that could contribute to the crystallization of 
49 Ibid.
50 Lucas Carlos Lima, “The Evidential Weight of Experts before the ICJ: Reflections on 
the Whaling in the Antarctic Case”, 6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2015), 
621, 629, https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idv022.
51 Pellet, supra note 41, at 149; Kate Parlett and Amy Sander, “Into the Void: A Counsel 
Perspective on the Need to Articulate Rules Concerning Disclosure Before the ICJ”, 113 
AJIL Unbound (2019), 302, https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.37.
52 See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, “The International Legal Profession: A Need for More 
Governance?”, 90 American Journal of International Law (1996), 250, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0002930000020509; Parlett and Sander, supra note 46, at 
302.
17
customary international law rules.53 The main content of these ethical 
standards may be summarised as follows: counsel must be loyal to the 
clients in a way that is consistent with the fair administration of justice 
and promotion of the rule of law by the relevant court; they shall perform 
their duties with independence and without regard to personal interests 
or external pressure, discharging their duties with integrity, diligence, 
efficiency, and confidentiality.54 Furthermore, if a counsel is also a 
member of a national Bar, their professional conduct may be governed 
by domestic law, under the relevant national rules on professional ethics, 
if they apply to activities before international adjudicative institutions.55 
Moreover, the reputation of the counsel may play a significant role in 
ensuring respect for ethical standards as well, since a renowned counsel 
has an interest in preserving their reputation to attract more clients.56
Written pleadings are usually prepared by the agent and are subject to 
careful scrutiny by different governmental bodies.57 As noted by Rosalyn 
Higgins, “legal argument advanced on behalf of a State requires prior 
agreement between a myriad of governmental departments before the 
53 See, e.g., ILA, supra note 38. See, generally, Arman Sarvarian, Professional Ethics at 
the International Bar (2013).
54 ILA, supra note 38, Principle 2. The content of these standards is detailed ibid., 
Principles 3-7.
55 The M/V Louisa case, Individual Opinion of Judge Cot, supra note 10, at para. 34; 
Parlett and Sander, supra note 51, at 304.
56 Cot, supra note 15, at 836. 
57 See Pellet, supra note 41, at 154.
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hapless counsel can begin to draft. And then his draft submissions will 
have to be crawled over by each and every one of the departments 
concerned and probably even be cleared by ministers”.58 Consequently, 
although counsel may contribute to the drafting of the written pleadings, 
the ICJ Statute mentions them mainly in relation to the oral phase,59 
where their role of “appearing on behalf of the parties becomes 
evident”.60 It is in this phase that counsel usually take the stage, after a 
brief allocution by the agent, to explore the legal dimensions of the 
dispute at hand and try to persuade the Court of the soundness of their 
client’s arguments.
Accordingly, counsel are tasked with the legal assistance of the State, 
which does not encompass the entitlement to exercise procedural powers 
on behalf of the State. They do not play any formal role in relation to the 
procedure before the ICJ, which is strictly controlled by the agent.
2.3 The Different Functions of Agents versus Counsel 
The distinction between the agent on the one hand and counsel on the 
other is apparently simple in the ICJ Statute: the agent represents the 
58 Rosalyn Higgins, “Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom”, 50 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly (2001), 121, 127, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/iclq/50.1.121.
59 See, e.g., Articles 43(5) and 54(1) of the ICJ Statute. 
60 Hugh Thirlway, The International Court of Justice (2016), 98.
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State, the counsel assists the State.61 The separation between the 
functions of representation and assistance before the Word Court has 
been confirmed during the first amendment of the Rules of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, when the Registrar emphasised the clear 
distinction between the role of the agent, who was tasked with liaising 
between the Court and their government, “and the task of an advocate 
whose duty it was to expound his government’s legal standpoint.”62 An 
early arbitral award has stressed this distinction of roles, by affirming that 
agents should be considered “not as mere lawyers, [...] but as the official 
representatives of the [State]. Otherwise, it will never be known whether 
the agent is expressing personal opinions, or the official point of view of 
his Government, and the proceedings would be hybrid and indefinable.”63 
Accordingly, there is no doubt that the role of the agent is prominent in 
comparison to that of the counsel. However, this does not bar necessarily 
from considering the counsel’s words as acts of the State.
61 On this difference, see Angela Del Vecchio, Le parti nel processo internazionale 
(1975), 119-120; Ziegler and Jonathan, supra note 39, at 549. The use of the 
expression ‘legal representation’ (e.g. by Quintana, supra note 33, at 223) is not aimed 
at conflating the roles of agents and counsel.
62 Ibid., at 224, fn 27 (quoting Permanent Court of International Kustice Advisory 
Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (1920), 
119).
63 French-Mexican Claims Commission, supra note 21, at 355 (author’s translation).
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The fact that only the agent can liaise with the Court does not mean 
that counsel “are involved in a personal capacity”,64 but simply that they 
lack the ability of binding the State in procedural matters before the ICJ. 
As aptly pointed out by Juan José Quintana, the ICJ Statute and 
customary international law never prevent the counsel from binding their 
State, but rather, only limit their capacity in relation to procedural 
matters.65 The following section explains why counsel do not act in a 
personal capacity, but rather, why, under international law, their words 
should be considered as the words of the State they assist.
3 The Pleadings of Counsel as Acts of the Litigating State
Whereas counsel assisting the State in the written phase are not 
directly governed by the ICJ Statute, arguably, counsel who appear 
during the oral phase are organs of the litigating State even though they 
lack the power of representation.66 At a closer scrutiny, international law, 
though a prism of different legal rules, considers to certain extent the 
words pronounced by counsel as originating from the State they assist in 
the courtroom. 
64 Serena Forlati, The International Court of Justice: An Arbitral Tribunal or a Judicial 
Body? (2014), 53.
65 Quintana, supra note 33, at 224.
66 According to Monaco, in the written phase, only agents acts as State organs (Monaco, 
supra note 5, at 376). 
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The key conceptual node is the difference between attribution of State 
conduct and representation of the State, which crosses different areas of 
international law.67 “Attribution” means the fact that a certain human 
conduct can be regarded as a conduct of a State.68 This concept is 
relevant both for lawful and unlawful conduct of States,69 even though it 
has been explored mainly in relation to the attribution of wrongful acts.70 
Accordingly, the use of the word “attribution” in the context of this study 
should not be considered as blurring the distinction between rules 
pertaining to lawful and unlawful conduct.71 What is important here is the 
67 E.g., in the law of treaties, only some specific organs of the State can express the 
consent to be bound (see Arts. 7-8 VCLT), even though the capacity to conclude a treaty 
pertains to the entire State (see Art. 6 VCLT). I have discussed this difference in relation 
to the response to an international wrongful act in Marco Longobardo, “State Immunity 
and Judicial Countermeasures”, 31 European Journal of International Law 
(forthcoming), section 3, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3688059.
68 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (2013), 113.
69 Luigi Condorelli, “L’imputation à l’état d’un fait internationalment illicite: solutions 
classiques et nouvelles tendances”, 189 Recueil des Cours (1984) 9, 38 and 40, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-8096_pplrdc_A9780792300571_01.
70 See ibid.; Paolo Palchetti, L’organo di fatto dello Stato nell’illecito internazionale 
(2007); Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, State Responsibility Revisited: The Factual Nature of the 
Attribution of Conduct to the State (2017).
71 ILC, Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice, UN Doc. 
A/73/10 (2018) 37, para. 2. See, also, Third Report on State Responsibility of the 
Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Ago, UN Doc. A/CN.4/246 and Add.1-3 (1971), para. 
109.
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fact that, although only the agent represents the State before the ICJ, 
also the statements of counsel are attributable to the State with some 
consequences that are relevant for international law.
The fact that the words of counsel are attributed to the State is 
demonstrated by a number of factors. For instance, the ICJ does not 
make any distinctions between the pleadings of the agents and the 
pleadings of the counsel when it reconstructs the position of the parties 
to a dispute.72 The ICJ regularly relies on pleadings of counsel both in 
relation to assertion of facts that are relevant for a specific dispute,73 and 
72 See, among many other examples, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, 168, 
para. 97; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2007, 43, paras. 139, 158, 215; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, 99, para. 105; 
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v.  Senegal), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, 422, paras. 65-66; Jadhav (India v. Pakistan), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019, 418, paras. 102, 145. 
73 See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, supra note 72, at paras. 139, 158, 215; Certain Activities Carried 
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in relation to assertions of law.74 Accordingly, there is no doubt that the 
Court takes their words as the official position of the litigating States, 
rather than as private opinions. For this reason, usually counsel do not 
reply directly to the questions posed by the bench, but rather, they prefer 
to discuss the content with the agent, usually providing written replies 
subsequently.75 
Moreover, the ILC has recognised that pleadings before the ICJ are 
sources of relevant State practice and opinio juris in relation to the 
formation of international customary law, without making any distinction 
between the words expressed by agents and by counsel.76 This position 
reflects the ILA’s view as expressed in relation to the formation of 
Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a 
Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2015, 665, para. 158; Jadhav, supra note 72, at para. 145.
74 See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 72, at para. 105; 
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 72, at paras. 
65-66; Jadhav, supra note 72, at para. 102. 
75 See Arthur Watts, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of International Dispute Settlement”, 
5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2001), 21, 26; Cecily Rose, “Questioning 
the Silence of the Bench: Reflections on Oral Proceedings at the International Court of 
Justice”, 18 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy (2008), 47, 56.
76 ILC, supra note 71, commentary to Conclusion 6, para. 5 and commentary to 
Conclusion 10, para. 4; Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law 
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customary international law.77 Counsel acknowledged that the content of 
their pleadings constitutes State practice or manifestations of opinio juris, 
even though they have emphasised that the relevant statements are 
directed to win the litigation rather than to express the formal view of the 
State on a point of law: for example, Crawford does not think that “there 
is any doubt that [a counsel’s pleading] constitutes state practice. But it 
is state practice sub modo, because it is not free of the environment in 
which it occurs”, whereas Pellet observes that it “is very interesting to 
use the pleadings before the ICJ or elsewhere to establish opinio iuris”.78 
The view that pleadings, with no distinctions between statements of the 
agents versus statements of counsel, are a source of relevant State 
practice and/or opinio juris is shared also by the International Committee 
by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/672 (2014), paras. 41(b) and 
75.
77 ILA, Report on Formation of Customary International Law (2000), 14.
78 Crawford, Pellet and Redgwell, supra note 3, at 10. 
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of the Red Cross79 and by most scholars.80 Even those who suggest a 
more cautious approach in considering pleadings as elements of 
international customary law do not base their position on the fact that 
counsel’s pleadings are not attributable to the State.81 Overall, the 
assumption that the content of these pleadings is State practice that may 
be relevant for the formation of customary international law appears 
sound and, to the best knowledge of this author, there is no serious claim 
that pleadings of counsel should be seen as “teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists” under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute.82
79 See Jean Marie-Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Volume I, Rules (2005), 851. Note that the reference is to an 
advisory proceeding, where the spokespersons for the relevant States are not identified 
either as agents or counsel.
80 See Michael Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of International Law”, 47 British Yearbook 
of International Law (1976), 1, 2, https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/47.1.1; Maurice H. 
Mendelson, “The Formation of Customary International Law”, 272 Recueil des Cours 
(1998), 155, 204, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-
8096_pplrdc_A9789041112378_02; Watts, supra note 75, at 26 and 29; Mark E. Villiger 
in ILA, supra note 77, at 19, fn 42; Rose, supra note 75, at 56; Martins Paparinskis, The 
International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (2013), 16; Patrick 
Dumberry, The Formation and Identification of Rules of Customary International Law in 
International Investment Law (2016), 214, 221-224; Sharpe, supra note 18, at 677-
678, 695; Shaw, supra note 11, at para. 281. 
81 See, e.g., Ugo Villani, “La rilevazione della consuetudine internazionale: una lezione 
ancora attuale”, in G. Nesi and P. Gargiulo (eds.), Luigi Ferrari Bravo: il diritto 
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Similarly, the pleadings of counsel may be considered as relevant 
“subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” under Article 
31(3)(b) of the VCLT, or broader subsequent practice relevant as a 
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the VCLT.83 
This does not mean that only the practice mentioned by the pleadings 
should be taken into account, but rather, also the pleadings themselves 
are manifestations of the oral practice of the litigating State. As noted by 
the ILC, subsequent State practice “may either consist of a direct 
application of the respective treaty or be a statement regarding the 
interpretation or application of the treaty”.84 The latter includes 
internazionale come professione (2015), 67, 72; Tarcisio Gazzini, Interpretation of 
International Investment Treaties (2016), 193-195; Stephan W. Schill, “MFN Clauses as 
Bilateral Commitments to Multilateralism: A Reply to Simon Batifort and J. Benton 
Heath”, 111 American Journal of International Law (2017), 914, 927, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2017.94; Tullio Treves, “The Expansion of International 
Law”, 398 Recueil des Cours (2019), 162, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-
8096_pplrdc_A9789004412248_01.
82 See, e.g., Sandesh Sivakumaran, “The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the 
Development of International Law”, 66 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2017), 1, 19 and 28, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589316000531 (who refers to 
teachings that are cited by counsel, rather than to counsel’s pleadings as teachings 
themselves). 
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statements rendered before the ICJ, either by the agents or by counsel. 
Indeed, it is quite common that counsel advance particular 
interpretations of relevant treaties in their pleadings, which are duly 
considered by the ICJ as the State’s official view on that interpretive 
issue: for instance, the Court quoted a counsel for Serbia in relation on 
whether the Genocide Convention envisages or not that a State can 
commit genocide,85 while the words of a counsel for Uganda were quoted 
in relation to the interpretation of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement.86 
Moreover, in the Oil Platform case, the ICJ defined the scope of Article 
X(1) of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights 
between the US and Iran taking into specific account the fact that a 
counsel for Iran had expressed a view on the interpretation of that treaty 
in the oral pleadings that was consistent with the US one.87
83 On these two different roles of subsequent practice in treaty interpretation, see ILC, 
supra note 71, at paras. 16-35). 
84 First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Georg Nolte, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/660 (2013), para. 110 (emphasis added). See, also, ILC, supra note 71, 
Conclusion 5. For more on this, see Irina Buga, Modification of Treaties by Subsequent 
Practice (2018), 24-27.
85 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, supra note 72, at para. 158 
86 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra note 72, at para. 97.
87 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I. C. 
J. Reports 2003, 161, para. 115: “Article X, paragraph 1, envisages both freedoms, 
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As demonstrated by the significant practice of investor-State arbitral 
tribunals, the main problem of considering counsel’s pleadings under 
Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT rests on the fact that sometimes they do not 
establish an agreement of the parties regarding one treaty’s 
interpretation, since they are rendered in adversarial contexts in order to 
win a specific case.88 Yet, there is no opposition against the idea that, in 
principle, counsel’s pleadings are acts of the litigating State that may be 
relevant to demonstrate the existence of a subsequent practice 
establishing an agreement on the treaty interpretation.89 Indeed, States 
have increasingly accepted this view,90 which should be considered to be 
correct.
freedom of commerce and freedom of navigation, as argued by the United States and 
accepted by Iran during the oral hearings” (emphasis added).
88 See, e.g., Gas Natural SDG SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/03/10, Decision 
of 17 June 2005, 47, fn 12. See also the cases analysed by Anthea Roberts, “Power and 
Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States”, 104 American 
Journal of International Law (2010), 179, 217-224, 
https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.104.2.0179; Kendra Magraw, “Investor-State 
Disputes and the Rise of Recourse to State Party Pleadings as Subsequent Agreements 
or Subsequent Practice under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 30 ICSID 
Review (2015), 142, https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siu036. 
89 Roberts, supra note 88, at 217-218; Dumberry, supra note 80, at 220-227.
90 See Lisa Bohmer, “USA and Mexico Submit that NAFTA Parties Reached a Binding 
Subsequent Agreement on Interpretation of the Treaty’s National Treatment Provision”, 
IAReporter (24 June 2020), www.iareporter.com/articles/usa-and-mexico-submit-that-
nafta-parties-reached-a-binding-subsequent-agreement-on-interpretation-of-the-
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The same conclusion may be reached by applying the law on State 
responsibility to counsel’s conduct, even if this is done here just for 
theoretical completeness rather than in response to actual instances in 
international practice. Should a counsel violate a rule of international law 
during their activity before the Court, that conduct very likely would be 
considered a wrongful act of the State. The identification of the relevant 
rule of attribution needs some clarification. Usually, counsel are not 
organs of the State according to its domestic law and, as a result, they 
are outside the scope of Article 4(2) of the DARS. However, it is possible 
to consider counsel as individuals acting under “the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of, that State” pursuant to Article 8 of the 
DARS. As affirmed by Crawford, “what [a counsel] say[s] in the 
International Court is read by the agent and approved by the agent, and 
it is as such a representative view of the State”,91 whereas Rosenne 
points out that “speeches by counsel, of whatever nationality, are 
normally made in Court on the authority of the agent.”92 Similarly, 
Brownlie recalls that “all material presented to the tribunal must have the 
authorization of the government-appointed head of the team, the head 
treatys-national-treatment-provision/. See, for more references, Martins Paparinskis, 
“MFN Clauses and Substantive Treatment: A Law of Treaties Perspective of the 
‘Conventional Wisdom’”, 112 AJIL Unbound (2018), 49, 51-52, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.28  
91 Crawford in Crawford, Pellet and Redgwell, supra note 3, at 10. See, also, Dumberry, 
supra note 80, at 221.
92 Shaw, supra note 11, at para. 281.
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of the delegation, usually designated as ‘the agent’”.93 Accordingly, 
Monaco’s view that the entire activity of counsel “se fais sous le contrôle 
des agents”94 appears correct and in line with the requirements of Article 
8. However, so far no responsibility of States has been invoked in relation 
to counsel’s conduct before the Court.
Finally, the ICJ Statute embodies further evidence of the fact that 
counsel’s actions are acts of the State by conferring functional immunity 
on counsel in their dealings with the ICJ. Under Article 42(3), “[t]he 
agents, counsel, and advocates of parties before the Court shall enjoy 
the privileges and immunities necessary to the independent exercise of 
their duties.” Although this rule resonates those on diplomatic immunity, 
at a closer glance it pertains to functional immunity of counsel in their 
relationship with the ICJ.95 For the purposes of this article, it should be 
noted that, traditionally, international law grants functional immunity to 
protect individuals who act on behalf of the State.96 Accordingly, even the 
rules on immunity of counsel point towards the conclusion that, when 
involved in the oral pleadings, they act on behalf of the appointing State.
93 Brownlie, supra note 1, at 3.
94 Monaco, supra note 5, at 380. See, also, Del Vecchio, supra note 61, at 120.
95 Valencia-Ospina, supra note 7, at paras. 20-21; Robert Kolb, The International Court 
of Justice (2013), 1193.
96 See the award in the case The Enrica Lexie Incident (Italy v. India), 21 May 2020, 
paras. 843-846, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/16500. See, also, Rosanne Van 
Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and 
International Human Rights Law (2008), 103-157.
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4 Counsel and the Legitimacy of the International Judicial 
Function
The fact that counsel appear on behalf of one State and that their 
statements are considered as emanated by that State should be taken 
into account when assessing counsel’s role in relation to the international 
judicial function. Indeed, most counsel consider that putting forward the 
best argument for the State that has appointed them furthers the goals 
of international justice, especially in relation to States that are perceived 
as less powerful in the international arena and that are involved in 
politically sensitive cases.
The most notable case is that of Brownlie who appeared as a counsel 
in a number of sensitive cases before the ICJ, defending States 
represented by regimes that are sometimes perceived as pariahs, such 
as Libya,97 suspect genocidaire such as Serbia,98 and alleged 
perpetrators of massive violations of international humanitarian law such 
as Uganda.99 Brownlie, who never assisted the UK but, rather, often 
97 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. UK; Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. USA), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1998, 9 and 115.
98 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, supra note 72.
99 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra note 72.
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advocated cases against his own State,100 took pride in defending 
unpopular clients. In a number of occasions, he declared that he was 
guided by the “cab-rank” principle, a rule of the British Bar according to 
which a lawyer must accept every case falling into their field of expertise 
if approached by a potential client,101 even though this rule does not bind 
barristers appearing before the ICJ.102 Brownlie believed that the 
availability of legal counsel to every State strengthened the international 
rule of law, even in cases of politically sensitive disputes.103
Brownlie’s position received widespread praises over the years104 and, 
other counsel involved in politically sensitive cases have echoed it. For 
instance, already in 1949, Pierre Cot, answering some newspapers 
100 In addition to the aforementioned case on behalf of Libya, see Legality of Use of 
Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. UK), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2004, 1307.
101 Brownlie, supra note 1, at 3; Ian Brownlie, “International Law at the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations: General Course on Public International Law”, 255 
Recueil des Cours (1996), 9, 22, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-
8096_pplrdc_A9789041103185_01.
102 Philippe Sands and Arman Sarvarian, “The Contribution of the UK Bar to International 
Law”, in R. McCorquodale and J.-P. Gauci (eds.), British Influences on International Law, 
1915-2015 (2016), 497, 516.
103 Brownlie, supra note 101, at 22.
104 See, e.g., Philippe Sands, “Sir Ian Brownlie Obituary”, The Guardian (11 January 
2010); Hisashi Owada, “Sir Ian Brownlie, KT, CBE, QC (1932–2010): The Professor as 
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criticism against his assistance to the pro-Soviet Albania,105 affirmed that 
“tant que la France existera, on y trouvera des juristes pour présenter 
devant les tribunaux internationaux la cause des petits quand ils sont 
accusés à tort au même à raison par des grands”.106 Likewise, the former 
legal adviser to the US State Department Abram Chayes, in response to 
criticism on his role as counsel of Nicaragua against the US – which led 
to the removal of his portrait from the wall of legal counsel in the State 
Department!107 –, declared that he wanted “[t]o hold America to its own 
best standards”, mentioning respect for the rule of law and commitment 
to the peaceful settlement of internal disputes.108 Similarly, William 
Schabas, in response to some criticisms on his assistance to Myanmar in 
Counsel”, 81 British Yearbook of International Law (2011), 1, 6, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/brr004; Vaughan Lowe, “Sir Ian Brownlie, KT, CBE, QC 
(1932–2010)”, ibid., 9, 11-12, https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/brr005; Sands and 
Sarvarian, supra note 102, at 517.
105 Jean-Pierre Cot, “The Bar”, in K. Bannelier, T. Christakis and S. Heathcote (eds)., 
The ICJ and the Evolution of International Law: The Enduring Impact of the Corfu 
Channel Case (2012), 21, 24.
106 Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania) case, Verbatim record 1949/2, 662.
107 Alain Pellet, “The Nicaragua Case: ‘Mafiosi’s’ and ‘Veteran’s’ Approaches Combined”, 
25 Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), 481, 481-482, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156512000155.
108 Paul S. Reichler, “Holding America to Its Own Best Standards: Abe Chayes and 
Nicaragua in the World Court”, 42 Harvard International Law Journal (2001), 15, 15.
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the 2019 genocide case,109 noted that both sides of any dispute before 
the ICJ have a right to employ competent legal assistance.110 
In this author’s opinion, the invocation of such a “right” is intrinsically 
linked to Brownlie’s idea of competent legal assistance by counsel as a 
factor strengthening international rule of law.111 Absent the availability of 
external competent legal counsel, litigating States without strong 
governmental expertise in the field of public international law would be 
disadvantaged when involved in unpopular cases, and might decide not 
to participate in the proceedings or would avoid consenting to the ICJ 
jurisdiction tout court. 
Moreover, it should be born in mind that counsel before the ICJ play a 
wider role in addition to just advancing the interests of their clients. 
Through their arguments, counsel feed legal inputs into the Bench, 
contributing to the ascertainment and development of international law 
by the Court.112 To this end, it is necessary to recall that the ICJ has a 
109 See Anthony Deutsch, “Myanmar’s Lawyer to Critics on Genocide Case: Everyone 




111 Andrew Nachemson, “The Truth About Myanmar’s Genocide Case Defense Lawyer”, 
The Diplomat (10 March 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-truth-about-
myanmars-genocide-case-defense-lawyer/.
112 Sivakumaran, supra note 82, at 28; Gregory Messenger, “The Practice of Litigation 
at the ICJ: The Role of Counsel in the Development of International Law”, in Moshe 
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public function broader than the settlement of the specific dispute at 
hand, in relation to the proper administration of international justice and 
the clarification and the progressive development of international law.113 
Accordingly, States should be entitled to the best available legal 
assistance as a means to allow the ICJ to perform its functions in the best 
possible way, enhancing the perception of legitimacy of the entire 
international judicial function especially when politically sensitive matters 
are at stake. 
Since counsel act on behalf of the State, it is possible that they are 
called to present arguments that they would not support as individuals or 
scholars. As admitted by Crawford, “[t]here comes a point where you 
simply have to do your best and then comply with instructions. And 
instructions may turn out to be right or wrong”.114 For this reason, in the 
passage quoted at the beginning of this article, Brownlie was crystal-clear 
in affirming that the counsel “are working exclusively as representatives 
of the State concerned and not as unauthorized experts or amici 
curiae”,115 implicitly recognising that the same individuals might hold 
different views if heard in their personal capacity. From this perspective 
and in light of the aforementioned control of the agents on the text of 
Hirsch and Andrew Lang (eds.), Research Handbook on the Sociology of International 
Law (2018), 208.
113 Ziegler and Jonathan, supra note 39, at 563, fn 101.
114 Crawford in Crawford, Pellet and Redgwell, supra note 3, at 21. See, also, Remiro 
Brotóns, supra note 37, at 508.
115 Brownlie, supra note 1, at 3.
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counsel’s oral pleadings, affirming that counsel have “liberté dénoncer 
toute sorte d’opinions personnelles, quand bien même ces opinions 
seraient en contradiction avec l’opinion de leur Gouvernement”116 refers 
to statements rendered outside the Courtroom, where the practitioner 
who acted as a counsel may hold a view that is different from that of the 
assisted State. 
As a result, in principle, the content of pleadings of counsel should 
primarily been regarded as reflecting the position of the State rather than 
that of a specific counsel as a scholar, who might or might not agree with 
the State on all the legal points advanced. As noted by Remiro Brotóns, 
“[a] professor’s only obligation is to search for the truth; the advocate 
has to look for ways to satisfy his client using the laws that suit him best, 
his task consists in solving difficulties, not in making the solutions 
difficult.”117 Conflating the personal view of the counsel and the 
adversarial position of a litigating State would be a dangerous 
simplification that could discourage qualified practitioners from playing 
an important role in the service of the proper functioning of international 
justice. 
For this reason, the position of the counsel in the oral pleadings is 
different from that of legal advisers of the State in the extrajudicial 
conduct of international relations. While the latter has a duty to highlight 
with diligence the negative aspects of a certain course of action so that 
116 French-Mexican Claims Commission, supra note 21, at 355.
117 Remiro Brotóns, supra note 37, at 518.
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the State can take the best decision,118 the former must present the 
official position of the State to the Court after having negotiated it with 
the agent outside the Courtroom.119 When involved in ICJ proceedings, 
usually legal advisers are members of the agent’s team rather than 
counsel,120 and, notwithstanding the aforementioned diligence 
professional obligations, when they act as counsel before the ICJ, they 
are perceived as mainly defending the interests of the State they 
represent rather than exercising truly advisory functions.121
Clearly, there are limits to the fact that counsel are expected to follow 
instructions in light of their ethical duties towards the Court, which 
prevails over their clients’ interests.122 For instance, the fact that, 
118 The exploration of the duties of legal advisers in international law is beyond the 
purview of this article. On this topic, see, generally, Antonio Cassese, “The Role of Legal 
Advisors in Ensuring that Foreign Policy Conforms to International Legal Standards”, 14 
Michigan Journal of International Law (1992-1993), 139; Richard B. Bilder and Detlev 
F. Vagts, “Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture”, 98 American Journal of 
International Law (2004), 689, https://doi.org/10.2307/3216693; Harold H. Koh, “The 
Legal Adviser’s Duty to Explain”, 41 Yale Journal of International Law (2016), 189; A. 
Zidar and J.-P. Gauci (eds.), The Role of Legal Advisers in International Law (2016).
119 On this difference, see Luigi Ferrari Bravo, “Méthodes de recherché de la coutume 
internationale dans la pratique des Etats”, 192 Recueil des Cours (1985), 233, 270-271, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-8096_pplrdc_A9789024733736_02. Consequently, 
this author would be cautious in endorsing the equation between legal advisers and 
counsel suggested by Harry Aitken, “The Duties of a Government International Legal 
Adviser”, EJIL:Talk! (2 June 2020), www.ejiltalk.org/the-duties-of-a-government-
international-legal-adviser/.  
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according to some reconstructions, an eminent British counsel knowingly 
presented misleading information to the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case is 
regrettable.123 Counsel are not mouthpiece of the States they assist, but 
rather, their conduct should always be linked to the proper functioning of 
international justice.124 Here, the second quote by Brownlie, already 
partially mentioned at the beginning of this article, should be borne in 
mind: the counsel “retains a significant degree of independence and 
aloofness. If the barrister simply identifies with the client in all respects, 
his value will diminish.”125 Especially in defending States that are alleged 
to have committed gross violations of international law, counsel should 
act upon a sense of duty rather than sympathy.126 
120 Jessica Gladstone, “The Legal Adviser and International Disputes: Preparing to 
Commence or Defend Litigation or Arbitration”, in Zidar and Gauci (eds.), supra note 
118, 34, at 38-39.
121 Andraž Zidar, “Legal Advisers and Professional Ethics”, ibid., 313, at 320.
122 “Fair administration of justice” is the first principle guiding counsel under the ILA 
rules, supra note 38, Principle 2.
123 The reference is to the British legal team’s decision to label as covered by naval 
secrecy documents which would have been detrimental to the British position in the 
Corfu Channel case when, apparently, there was no ground for naval secrecy. For 
different views, see A. Carty, “The Corfu Channel Case – and the Missing Admiralty 
Orders”, 3 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2004), 1, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/157180301773732618; Cot, supra note 93, at 32-33; 
Sarvarian, supra note 53, at 103-104. 
124 Crawford, supra note 1, at 330.
125 Brownlie, supra note 1, at 3. See, also, Remiro Brotóns, supra note 37, at 520.
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In extreme cases, if constrained between their ethical principles and 
the instructions received from their States, counsel might decide to refuse 
to work for the State or to resign.127 Such a last resort measure would 
hardly become of public knowledge. One could wonder whether the 
resignation of Maurice Mendelson before Qatar submitted forged 
documents in the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between 
Qatar and Bahrain case is relevant for the present article.128 Likewise, in 
2019, when Kenya asked the Court to delay the hearings in the Maritime 
Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya) case to recruit a new 
legal team,129 one commentator asked whether this was due to a 
resignation of the legal team following discussions in Kenya to settle the 
dispute militarily.130
126 James Crawford, “Ian Brownlie 1932-2010”, (2012), 17, 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2202713. 
127 Remiro Brotóns, supra note 37, at 506.
128 On the episode, see Maurice Mendelson, “The Curious Case of Qatar v. Bahrain in 
the International Court of Justice, 72 British Yearbook of International Law (2001), 183 
(with attention to fn ** and 70), https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/72.1.183. Today, 
Principle 6.1 of ILA, supra note 38, affirms that counsel “shall refrain from presenting 
or otherwise relying upon evidence that he or she knows or has reason to believe to be 
false or misleading.”
129 Aggrey Mutambo, “ICJ Postpones Kenya-Somalia Case to November to Allow Nairobi 
Seek New Legal Team”, The East African (6 September 2019).
130 Bruno Gelinas-Faucher, Tweets dated 8 September 2009, 
https://twitter.com/bruno_faucher/status/1170732132173565952). No evidence that 
substantiates this has been found by this author.
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In any case, the role of counsel in politically sensitive proceedings is 
delicate. It is a continuous process of negotiation, with counsel 
constrained between the fact that the pleadings should reflect the State’s 
view rather than their personal opinions, and their professional ethical 
standards. Such a negotiation should not ignore the fact that the 
availability of competent legal assistance enhances the credibility and 
legitimacy of the ICJ judicial function, especially in relation to politically 
sensitive disputes involving represented by regimes that are sometimes 
perceived as pariahs.
5 Conclusions
This article has demonstrated that counsel do not act before the ICJ in 
their private capacity, but rather, the content of their pleadings is 
considered under international law as an act of the litigating State. This 
means that counsel, despite lacking the representative powers bestowed 
upon the agent in relation to the Curt’s proceedings, can produce 
statements with legal value in relation to the position of the State they 
assist. For this reason, States keep a strict control on the content of the 
pleadings read by counsel. This situation deserves attention in relation to 
politically sensitive litigations, when there is a significant risk that a 
counsel could be identified with the argument presented on behalf of the 
litigating State. The content of the pleadings is both an act of the litigating 
State and a responsibility of the counsel who presents them and who 
41
must follow applicable ethical professional standards. It should be borne 
in mind that, especially when proceedings involve States represented by 
regimes that are sometimes perceived as pariahs, the availability of 
professional and competent counsel is in the interest of all stakeholders, 
since it enhances international rule of law and the legitimacy of 
international dispute settlement before the ICJ. 
